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Within the legal community judicial
independence is understood, not as an
intrinsic good or an end in itself, but as 
a means to achieve other ends.1 If judg-
es are independent–if they are insulat-
ed from political and other controls that
could undermine their impartial judg-
ment–it is thought that judges will be
better able to uphold the rule of law, pre-
serve the separation of powers, and pro-
mote due process of law.2 Scholars, judg-
es, and lawyers often acknowledge that
judicial independence has institutional
and decisional dimensions: institution-
al independence concerns the capacity
of the judiciary as a separate branch of
government to resist encroachments
from the political branches and thereby
preserve the separation of powers; deci-
sional independence, in contrast, con-
cerns the capacity of individual judges 
to decide cases without threats or intim-
idation that could interfere with their
ability to uphold the rule of law.3
Properly understood then, judicial
independence is circumscribed by the
purposes it serves: decisional indepen-
dence, for example, does not mean free-
dom from all external constraints, but
only those constraints that interfere
with a judge’s ability to uphold the rule
of law. Indeed, some forms of indepen-
dence from decisional constraint, such
as the freedom to decide cases for the
bene½t of friends or in exchange for
bribes, are antithetical to the rule-of-
law values that judicial independence is
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1  The ideas in this essay were ½rst presented 
at the 2007 conference on The Debate over Ju-
dicial Elections and State Court Judicial Selec-
tion, convened by the Sandra Day O’Connor
Project on the State of the Judiciary at George-
town University Law Center. A modi½ed ver-
sion of this essay appears in The Georgetown
Journal of Legal Ethics 21 (4) (Fall 2008). Thanks
to Bert Brandenburg, Barry Friedman, Steve
Burbank, and Roy Schotland for their com-
ments on an earlier draft of this essay and 
to Ted Brass½eld for his research assistance.
2  Stephen B. Burbank and Barry Friedman,
“Reconsidering Judicial Independence,” in 
Judicial Independence at the Crossroads: An Inter-
disciplinary Approach, ed. Burbank and Fried-
man (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publica-
tions, 2002), 9, 11–14.
3  Charles Gardner Geyh, When Courts & Con-
gress Collide: The Struggle for Control of Ameri-
ca’s Judicial System (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 2006), 6–7.
supposed to further. And so, if judicial
independence is to achieve its goals, 
it must operate within speci½ed con-
straints. It must, in other words, be 
tempered by judicial accountability. 
Like judicial independence, judicial
accountability is not an end in itself. It,
too, serves other ends: to promote the
rule of law, institutional responsibility,
and public con½dence in the courts. 
And like judicial independence, judicial
accountability has multiple forms: in-
stitutional accountability mechanisms
hold judges answerable collectively for
their conduct as a separate branch of
government, for example by subjecting
court budgets to legislative oversight;
behavioral accountability mechanisms
hold individual judges to account for
their conduct on and off the bench, for
example by subjecting them to discipline
for being abusive to litigants or accept-
ing inappropriate gifts from lawyers who
appear before them; and decisional ac-
countability makes judges answerable
for their judicial rulings, for example by
subjecting their decisions to appellate
review.4 As to decisional accountability,
however, suitable mechanisms are ideal-
ly limited to those that promote the rule
of law by correcting judicial error with-
out obliterating decisional indepen-
dence by subjecting judges to threats or
controls that could cause them to disre-
gard the law and implement the prefer-
ences of those who threaten or control
them. 
The perennial policy struggle is to
strike an optimal balance between ju-
dicial independence and accountabil-
ity, to ensure that judges are indepen-
dent enough to follow the facts and law
without fear or favor, but not so inde-
pendent as to disregard the facts or law
to the detriment of the rule of law and
public con½dence in the courts. The
American Bar Association’s Model Code
of Judicial Conduct, some variation of
which has been adopted by almost ev-
ery state supreme court, seeks to struc-
ture judicial conduct to preserve this 
balance. The 2007 Code tells judges that
they “shall act at all times in a manner
that promotes public con½dence in the
independence, integrity and impartial-
ity of the judiciary”;5 “shall uphold and
apply the law, and shall perform all du-
ties of judicial of½ce fairly and impar-
tially”;6 “shall not be swayed by public
clamor or fear of criticism”;7 “shall not
permit family, social, political, ½nancial,
or other interests or relationships to in-
fluence the judge’s judicial conduct or
judgment”;8 and “shall not convey or
permit others to convey the impression
that any person or organization is in a
position to influence the judge.”9
In the context of state judicial selection,
the struggle to balance independence
and accountability has played itself out
over the course of more than two cen-
turies, as ½ve distinct methods of select-
ing judges–each striking the balance 
in different ways–have vied for preemi-
nence. In the fledgling states, all judges
were selected by one of two methods:
gubernatorial appointment with legisla-
tive con½rmation (½ve states) or legisla-
4  Charles Gardner Geyh, “Rescuing Judicial
Accountability from the Realm of Political
Rhetoric,” Case Western Reserve Law Review 56
(2006): 911.
5  aba Model Code of Judicial Conduct (Ameri-
can Bar Association, 2007).
6  Ibid., Rule 2.2.
7   Ibid., Rule 2.4(A).
8  Ibid., Rule 2.4(B).
9  Ibid., Rule 2.4(C).
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tive appointment (eight states).10 The
colonial courts had been unhappily de-
pendent on the crown, and the new
states were committed to curbing their
judiciaries’ dependence on the execu-
tive branch–which is not to say that 
the new states were committed to an
independent judiciary. Several states
subjected their judges to a variety of 
legislative branch controls, including
reappointment, which led to a series of
independence-threatening confronta-
tions with state legislatures during the
1780s that troubled the framers of the
U.S. Constitution enough for them to
embed in Article III tenure and salary
protections for federal judges.
During the Jacksonian Era of the 1820s
and 1830s, populist calls for judicial ac-
countability initiated a movement to se-
lect judges via a third method: partisan
judicial elections. Although the early cat-
alyst for partisan judicial elections may
have been a desire for greater accounta-
bility, the partisan election movement
did not take hold until after the Jackso-
nians lost influence, led by reformers
who argued that elected judges who de-
rived their authority from the people
would be more independent-minded
than handpicked friends of governors, 
or jurists subject to the beck and call of
legislatures. Indeed, University of Vir-
ginia law professor Caleb Nelson found
that the impetus for the judicial election
movement was a desire to promote ju-
dicial independence from the political
branches, rather than to increase demo-
cratic accountability for judicial deci-
sions.11 Mississippi broke the ice in 1832,
and by 1909 thirty-½ve states either en-
tered the Union with judiciaries selected
by partisan election or had converted to
partisan elections from appointive sys-
tems.
In the early twentieth century, elect-
ed judiciaries were increasingly viewed
as incompetent and corrupt. During the
Progressive Era, worries that partisan
elections led to the selection of less-
than-capable and less-quali½ed judges
who were beholden to party bosses cul-
minated in a fourth form of judicial se-
lection: the nonpartisan election. By
1930, twelve new states had adopted
nonpartisan elections as the selection
method for their judiciaries.
In the minds of some, however, non-
partisan elections left voters with pre-
cious little information upon which to
cast an informed ballot, which led to the
selection of less-capable and less-quali-
½ed judges. In the minds of others, con-
tested elections–partisan or not–failed
to divorce judges suf½ciently from the
political process.12 In 1913, a ½fth meth-
od of judicial selection was devised: a
“merit selection” system, in which judg-
es were appointed by the governor from
a pool of candidates whose quali½ca-
10  Anthony Champagne and Judith Haydel,
“Introduction,” in Judicial Reform in the States,
ed. Champagne and Haydel (Lanham, Md.:
University Press of America, 1993), 3.
11  Caleb Nelson, “A Reevaluation of Scholar-
ly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Ju-
diciary in Antebellum America,” American
Journal of Legal History 37 (1993): 190. See 
also Kermit L. Hall, “Progressive Reform 
and the Decline of Democratic Accountabil-
ity: The Popular Election of State Supreme
Court Judges, 1850–1920,” American Bar 
Foundation Research Journal 9 (1984): 345; F.
Andrew Hanssen, “Learning About Judicial
Independence: Institutional Changes in the
State Courts,” Journal of Legal Studies 33
(2004): 445–448; Roy A. Schotland, “Myth,
Reality Past and Present, and Judicial Elec-
tions,” Indiana Law Review 35 (2002): 661–
662.
12  Charles Sheldon and Linda Maule, Choos-
ing Justice: The Recruitment of State and Feder-
al Judges (Pullman, Wash.: wsu Press, 1997),
6–7.
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tions had been reviewed and approved
by an independent commission. Judges
so appointed would then run unopposed
later in periodic retention elections, in
which voters would decide whether the
judge in question should be retained 
for another term. Missouri adopted the
½rst merit selection plan in 1940, and 
by 1989 twenty-three states had commis-
sion-based appointive systems (with 
and without retention elections) to se-
lect some or all of their judges.
More recently, the merit selection
movement has stalled. Constitutional
amendments to establish merit selec-
tion systems in Florida, Michigan, Ohio,
and South Dakota have been rejected 
by voters, and reformers in other juris-
dictions have struggled unsuccessfully 
to place merit selection proposals on
their ballots, while in some merit se-
lection states there have been calls for 
a return to contested elections.13
Meanwhile, nonpartisan elections
have enjoyed a renaissance. Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana,
and North Carolina moved from parti-
san to nonpartisan election systems in
the past thirty years. And in 2003 the
American Bar Association retreated
from its previous position of exclusive
support for merit selection, to a more
nuanced series of positions, one being
that “[f]or states that retain contested
elections as a means to select their judg-
es, all such elections should be non-par-
tisan and conducted in a non-partisan
manner.”14
Today, the American Judicature Soci-
ety reports15 that, at the supreme court
level, four states select judges by guber-
natorial appointment, two by legislative
appointment, eight by partisan election,
thirteen by nonpartisan election, and
twenty-three by merit selection. At the
intermediate appellate level, two states
select judges by gubernatorial appoint-
ment, two by legislative appointment,
six by partisan election, eleven by non-
partisan election, and eighteen by merit
selection. Finally, at the trial level, three
states select judges by gubernatorial ap-
pointment, two by legislative appoint-
ment, nine by partisan election, eigh-
teen by nonpartisan election, fourteen
by merit selection, and four by a combi-
nation of methods. (Even in states that
employ contested elections, judges are
often initially appointed by governors 
to ½ll the unexpired terms of retiring in-
cumbents.) 
Each of the ½ve methods of judicial se-
lection described above had its heyday 
at a different point in American history.
Consensus on the optimal method of ju-
dicial selection has been elusive. Many
have asserted that this is because there 
is no perfect method of judicial selection
–or, more harshly, because there is no
good method of judicial selection.16 A
more charitable explanation may be that
the objective of a good selection system
–an optimal balance between judicial
13  Matthew Streb, “Judicial Reform and the
Future of Judicial Elections,” in Running for
Judge: The Rising Political, Financial, and Legal
Stakes of Judicial Elections, ed. Streb (New York:
New York University Press, 2007), 205–206.
14  Justice in Jeopardy: Report of the Commission 
on the 21st Century Judiciary (American Bar Asso-
ciation, 2003), 76–77. The position of the Com-
mission on this point was subsequently adopt-
ed by the American Bar Association.
15  Data discussed in this paragraph are drawn
from http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialSelection
Charts.pdf.
16  See, for example, Champagne and Haydel,
“Introduction,” in Judicial Reform in the States,
ed. Champagne and Haydel, 15 –16; also Justice
in Jeopardy, 69.
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independence and accountability–is an
ever-moving target that generates peren-
nial calls for reform. In recent years, the
reform engine has been fueled by a series
of developments that have politicized
state judicial elections in arguably un-
precedented ways. 
Partisan judicial elections can be rela-
tively sleepy affairs in states where a sin-
gle political party is predominant and
the outcome of judicial races is all but
assured. Conversely, as Alan Tarr, a po-
litical scientist at Rutgers University,
observes, where party competition is
intense and parties establish clear ideo-
logical identities, the intensity tends to
spill over into judicial elections. In re-
cent years, signi½cant two-party com-
petition has become commonplace in
states and regions that traditionally 
were within the control of only one
party: 
One of the most dramatic changes dur-
ing the latter half of the twentieth centu-
ry was the spread of two party competi-
tion throughout the nation. Many states
that at one time were dominated by a sin-
gle party, particularly in the South and
New England, now regularly conduct
highly competitive elections.17
Studies of judicial reform in North Car-
olina and Texas link recent selection re-
form efforts there to the intensi½cation
of two-party competition for judicial of-
½ce.
As caseloads increased throughout 
the twentieth century, states sought 
to relieve docket pressures on their su-
preme courts by establishing interme-
diate courts of appeals and making their
supreme courts’ appellate jurisdiction
discretionary. Armed with the discre-
tion to set their own agendas, supreme
courts have increasingly allowed the in-
termediate courts of appeals to have the
½nal word in garden-variety disputes, in
which appellate review is limited to cor-
recting trial-court errors, and con½ned
their dockets to more controversial cases
in which the law is unclear and their pri-
mary mission is to “say what the law is.”
The net effect has been to highlight the
policy-making role that state supreme
courts play when ½lling gaps in consti-
tutional and statutory law and making
common law.18
Legal historian Emily Van Tassel ex-
plains a related development: “The po-
liticization of state constitutional deci-
sion-making coincides with the ‘new
Federalism’ of the Reagan era and the
willingness of many state appellate
courts to look to their own constitutions
for guidance in many areas of law previ-
ously left to the federal constitution.”19
That, in turn, has served to “raise the
pro½le of state court judges and make
control over state judgeships seem more
signi½cant to a greater range of interest
groups than in the recent past.”20 To the
extent that judges are perceived as mak-
ing constitutional policy when called
upon to interpret their constitutions in
new and different ways, it may blur the
distinction between judges and legisla-
tors in the public mind and intensify
calls to hold judges politically account-
able for their decisions. 
17  G. Alan Tarr, “State Judicial Selection and
Judicial Independence,” Appendix D, in Justice 
in Jeopardy, 5.
18  Paul Carrington, Daniel Meador, and 
Maurice Rosenberg, Justice on Appeal (St. 
Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Company, 
1976), 150.
19  Emily Van Tassel, “Challenges to Con-
stitutional Decisions of State Courts and 
Institutional Pressures on State Judiciaries,”
Appendix E, in Justice in Jeopardy, 3.
20  Ibid.
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As two-party competition has inten-
si½ed and the political pro½le of state 
supreme courts has elevated, campaign
spending in judicial races has increased.
Average campaign spending in contested
supreme court races has increased from
$364,348 in 1990 to $892,755 in 2004.21
In 2000, judicial candidates in supreme
court races raised $45 million;22 in 2002,
they raised $29 million; and in 2004,
they raised $42 million.23 While these
numbers appear to vary wildly, when
“outlier” races in Alabama, Illinois, 
and West Virginia are excluded, spend-
ing in the fourteen remaining states that
held supreme court elections in 2004 in-
creased by 163 percent since 2002, and in
2002 spending increased by 167 percent
since 2000.24 Between 2004 and 2006,
average spending on advertising in su-
preme court races increased from $1.5
million to $1.6 million; and in that time,
the median amount raised increased
from $201,623 to $243,910.25
When it comes to fund-raising, the
focus of attention has been on supreme
court races, where competition for judi-
cial of½ce has been stiffest. Even so, a
survey of over 2,400 judges conducted 
in 2001 found that 45 percent of lower-
court judges felt under pressure to raise
money for their campaigns during elec-
tion years, as compared to 36 percent 
of high-court judges. In the 2005–2006
election cycle, for example, trial lawyers
and corporate interests in a southern Illi-
nois race combined to give more than
$3.3 million to two candidates for a seat
on the state court of appeals, quadru-
pling the state record. Madison County,
Illinois, witnessed a $500,000 trial-court
campaign, and a Missouri trial-court
judge was defeated after an out-of-state
group poured $175,000 into a campaign
to defeat him.
Coinciding with the introduction of
big-league spending in judicial cam-
paigns and with heightened two-party
competition is the advent of big-league
interest-group involvement, in the form
of direct contributions to judicial can-
didates and independently organized
campaigns in support of or opposition 
to the candidates. The lion’s share of
interest-group spending has been on a
cluster of issues, traveling under the um-
brella of “tort reform,” that concern ju-
dicial rulings on issues relating to puni-
tive damages, products liability, medi-
cal malpractice, and insurance liability.
Plaintiffs’ bar and labor unions, aligned
with Democratic candidates, have been
pitted against the defense bar and busi-
ness, aligned with Republicans. Thus, in
2006 the two highest sources of contri-
butions were business interests and law-
yers, with 44 percent of all funds donat-
ed by the former and 21 percent by the
latter. Outside of groups devoted to the
tort reform issue, there have been other
interest groups that have actively sought
to defeat incumbents (sometimes suc-
cessfully) because of an opinion a judge
wrote or joined on such issues as capital
punishment, criminal sentencing, abor-
21  Chris Bonneau, “The Dynamics of Cam-
paign Spending in State Supreme Court Elec-
tions,” in Running for Judge, ed. Streb, 63.
22  The Politicization of the Judiciary (Common
Cause of Ohio, 2005).
23  2004 State Supreme Court Election Overview
(Justice at Stake Campaign, March 9, 2005).
24  Rachel Paine Caul½eld, “The Foreboding
National Trends in Judicial Elections,” confer-
ence paper available at http://www.keepmn
justiceimpartial.org/cau½eld_ia_judges_con-
ference.pdf (June 24, 2005), 2.
25  James Sample, Lauren Jones, and Rachel
Weiss, The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2006
(Washington, D.C.: Justice at Stake, 2007), 3.
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tion, gay rights, education funding, and
water rights. 
As James Gibson, a political scientist
at Washington University, notes, “The
use of attack ads in judicial elections is a
relatively new phenomenon.”26 In 2004
and 2006, approximately 20 percent of
all ads were negative. With increased
spending in judicial campaigns and in-
creased interest-group involvement has
come a greater emphasis on negative ad-
vertising. In a 2001 poll of judges, 54 per-
cent of trial judges and 54 percent of su-
preme court justices reported that the
conduct and tone of judicial campaigns
had gotten worse in the preceding ½ve
years. Until quite recently, interest
groups and political parties were respon-
sible for the bulk of negative television
advertising: 90 percent as of 2004. But
in 2006 the candidates themselves spon-
sored 60 percent of the negative adver-
tising. 
Since the 1970s, codes of judicial con-
duct have imposed signi½cant restric-
tions on judicial speech and associa-
tion during judicial campaigns. First,
judges have been subject to restrictions
on what they can say about issues that
may come before them as judges: the
1972 Model Code of Judicial Conduct
forbade judges from announcing their
positions on disputed issues (the An-
nounce Clause), while the 1990 and 
2007 Model Codes prohibit judicial can-
didates from making pledges, promises,
or commitments. Second, the codes re-
strict a judge’s political activities: for
example, judges must not serve as of½-
cers in, contribute to, or make speeches
on behalf of political organizations; 
they must not publicly oppose or en-
dorse other candidates; and they must
not solicit campaign funds other than
through their campaign committees. By
limiting what judges can say and do in
election campaigns, codes of conduct
seek to prevent judicial candidates from
becoming fully embroiled in the politi-
cal process and from turning judicial
races into referenda on their express 
or implied plans to decide future cases 
in speci½c ways.
In Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, the U.S. Supreme Court inval-
idated the Announce Clause, holding
that judicial candidates have a First
Amendment right to state their views 
on issues that may come before them
later, as judges.27 In the aftermath of
White, the American Bar Association
made modest adjustments to its Model
Code of Judicial Conduct in 2003: it de-
leted a clause that subjected judges to
discipline for appearing to make com-
mitments (but made apparent commit-
ments a new basis for disquali½cation)
and retained the general prohibitions 
on pledges, promises, commitments,
and political activities. 
Beginning in 2003, the aba’s Joint
Commission to Evaluate the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct revisited the
Model Code’s restrictions on campaign
speech and conduct, as part of a larger
project to revise the entire Code. The
Commission considered three possible
courses of action.28 First, it considered
embracing the spirit of White by dereg-
ulating campaign speech and conduct
generally, as North Carolina had done.
Second, it considered the midrange op-
26  James Gibson, “Challenges to the Impartial-
ity of State Supreme Courts: Legitimacy Theory
and ‘New Style’ Judicial Campaigns,” American
Political Science Review, forthcoming; draft on
½le.
27  536 U.S. 765 (2002).
28  I served as coreporter to the Commission
and was in attendance at all Commission meet-
ings. The views expressed here, however, are
my own and are not necessarily shared by the
Commission or its members.
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tion of retooling the political activities
canon to accommodate some speci½c
post-White rulings of the lower courts,
which would require the Commission 
to eliminate several restrictions on po-
litical activities and narrow signi½cant-
ly, if not eliminate, the Pledges, Promis-
es, and Commitments Clause. Third, it
considered the conservative approach 
of limiting the reach of White to its hold-
ing and staying the course pending fur-
ther clari½cation of White from the Su-
preme Court.
A majority of the Commission re-
mained concerned that the impact of
White on judicial campaigns was dele-
terious and was reluctant to deregulate
campaign speech and conduct beyond
what was required by the letter of the
Supreme Court’s holding. After lengthy
deliberations spanning nearly four years,
the Commission effectively chose the
third option described above, retaining
existing restrictions on campaign speech
and conduct in the political activities
canon. Instead, the Commission focused
its efforts on restructuring new Canon 4
(former Canon 5) to improve clarity and
speci½city, as the aba’s Report to the
House of Delegates explained:
Much of the material in Canon 5 was re-
tained, but was reorganized along several
axes. The reorganized Canon 4 differenti-
ates more clearly between sitting judges
who are and are not also judicial candi-
dates and nonjudges who become candi-
dates. Canon 4 continues to differentiate
between judicial candidates running for
public elections and those seeking ap-
pointment, and, within the former cate-
gory, it further differentiates between 
partisan, nonpartisan and retention elec-
tions.29
In the aftermath of White, judicial can-
didates have challenged remaining re-
strictions on their campaign speech and
conduct in the lower courts, and while
the results have been somewhat mixed,
the trend has favored the challengers.
Several courts have invalidated the
Pledges and Promises Clause, while oth-
ers have struck down restrictions on po-
litical activities. The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit, revisiting
other issues presented by the White case
on remand from the Supreme Court,
held that Minnesota could not discipline
judicial candidates for engaging in parti-
san activities (notwithstanding Minne-
sota’s purported interest in preserving
the nonpartisan character of its judicial
elections) or bypassing their campaign
committees and soliciting funds directly
from groups.30
Since 2002, when White was decided,
interest groups on the political left and
right have capitalized on the decision by
submitting questionnaires to the candi-
dates that solicit the candidates’ views
on a range of issues likely to come before
them as judges and that the candidates
ignore at their peril. Indeed, some inter-
est groups have been explicit about sup-
porting only those candidates that re-
spond.
Judicial elections were originally intro-
duced primarily to promote judicial in-
dependence by liberating judges from
the control of governors and legislators,
but they have since morphed into tools
that serve primarily to promote judicial
accountability. There seems to be a gen-
eral consensus that the recent develop-
ments described above are making judi-
29  aba Joint Commission to Evaluate the
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Report No.
200, Revised Model Code of Judicial Conduct
(February 12–13, 2007).
30  416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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cial elections look and feel more like
conventional political branch races, 
in the sense of being more competitive
and costly, with more interest groups
taking sides in more acrimonious con-
tests, and more candidates taking posi-
tions on the often policy-laden issues
that the candidates will be called upon 
to resolve as of½ce-holders. Where the
consensus breaks down is as to whether
these developments are welcome and
which judicial selection system is best
suited to counter or accommodate them. 
Contemporary proponents of parti-
san judicial elections proceed from the
premise that, in a democratic republic,
voters should choose the public of½-
cials who govern them and hold them
accountable for their performance in
of½ce. Underlying this premise is the
general assumption that judges are not
signi½cantly different from other pub-
lic of½cials, or are not different in ways
that warrant a different system of selec-
tion. A related assumption is that voters
in judicial and political branch races are
comparably motivated and equipped to
distinguish good candidates from bad
–or at least that voters in judicial races
are not so unmotivated and ill-equipped
as to undermine the legitimacy of the
choices they make. 
In an article I wrote several years ago, 
I questioned whether voters in judicial
elections were adequately motivated and
informed to hold judges accountable in 
a meaningful way, by pointing to data
showing that a substantial majority of
the public did not vote in judicial races
and was unfamiliar with the candidates.
Recent research suggests that my con-
cern was well-founded in traditional,
less-competitive races. Available data
con½rm an often substantial “roll-off” 
in judicial races, in which voters who
come to the polls vote in executive and
legislative branch races but not in judi-
cial. The roll-off is commonly attributed
to a lack of information about the candi-
dates; indeed, in a poll of American vot-
ers conducted in 2001, 73 percent report-
ed that they had only some or a little in-
formation about judicial candidates,
while 14 percent reported having none.31
In their study of judicial elections in the
news, Brian Schaffner and Jennifer Segal
Diascro, political scientists at American
University, conclude, “We should not 
be surprised to ½nd citizens lacking in-
formation about judicial races” because
“citizens turning to newspapers for in-
formation on state supreme court cam-
paigns will ½nd a dearth of coverage on
these contests.”32
It can be argued, however, that more
competitive judicial races, particularly in
a post-White environment, are increas-
ing voter interest and information levels
enough to hold judges meaningfully ac-
countable. In a comparison between two
Ohio Supreme Court races, political sci-
entists Laurence Baum and David Klein
found that the voter roll-off rate was
twice as high for the low visibility race 
as for the hotly contested one (although
they also found that in the hotly contest-
ed race, voters acquired only a slender
grasp of the issues at stake).33 Melinda
31  Martin P. Wattenberg, Ian McAllister, and
Anthony Salvanto, “How Voting is Like Taking
an sat Test: An Analysis of American Voter
Rolloff,” American Politics Quarterly 28 (2000):
234; Lawrence Baum and David Klein, “Voter
Responses to High-Visibility Judicial Cam-
paigns,” in Running for Judge, ed. Streb, 140–
141; Poll of American Voters, conducted by
Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner Research Inc. 
(Justice at Stake Campaign, 2001).
32  Brian Schaffner and Jennifer Segal Diascro,
“Judicial Elections in the News,” in Running for
Judge, ed. Streb, 115, 134.
33  Baum and Klein, “Voter Responses to High-
Visibility Campaigns,” in Running for Judge, ed.
Streb.
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Gann Hall, a political scientist at Michi-
gan State University, observes, “Without
the excitement generated by hard-fought
campaigns from contending candidates,
information upon which to cast votes is
poor, and voters are disinterested and
unmotivated to participate.”34 Now that
judicial elections have become noisier,
nastier, and costlier, we have more chal-
lengers and more defeated incumbents,
leading Hall to conclude, “When we
consider tangible indicators of electoral
accountability, we see that, under most
situations, supreme court elections per-
form quite well, particularly in the last
decade or so.”35 Rachel Paine Caul½eld,
a political scientist at Drake University,
found that in the post-White era, states
that have deregulated judicial speech 
the most “are seeing a change in how
candidates promote themselves and 
how they attack their opponents,” lead-
ing her to conclude that “it is entirely
possible that judicial candidates in these
states will increasingly rely on the abil-
ity to distinguish themselves from their
opponents based on controversial issue
positions.”36 Schaffner and Diascro con-
cur that, after White, “candidates may be
more likely to speak out on a wider array
of topics during campaigns, a dynamic
that would produce more news for re-
porters to cover,” which they view as a
welcome development “if judicial elec-
tions are to compel accountability in the
judiciary.”37
Recent data thus reveal that the brave
new world of expensive, high-pro½le,
hotly contested judicial races creates
greater voter interest, puts incumbents
at higher risk of defeat, and to that ex-
tent promotes unvarnished, speci½cally
political “accountability.”38 And since
competition is the most intense in parti-
san races, the argument concludes, it is
in partisan races that judicial accounta-
bility of this kind will be promoted most
effectively.
The critical question is whether this is
the kind of accountability that we want
judicial elections to promote. If, as a sig-
ni½cant segment of the political science
community believes, independent judg-
es are essentially unconstrained policy-
makers who decide cases by acting on
their personal preferences or attitudes,
then the answer would seem to be yes,
because elections will produce public
policies that better represent the citi-
zenry by creating incentives for judges 
to pay attention to citizen preferences
when deciding highly visible and pub-
licly salient issues. 
If, on the other hand, as the main-
stream legal community believes, inde-
pendent judges do their best to follow
the law, flexibly de½ned (consistent with
the legal model described at the begin-
ning of this paper), then the answer is
presumably no, because elections create
incentives for judges to set the law to one
side and pay attention to citizen prefer-
ences when deciding cases. Indeed, the
judge who openly defers to the electo-
rate’s preferences when deciding cases
exposes herself to discipline and re-
moval for violating multiple rules in 
the Code of Judicial Conduct: the duty
34  Melinda Gann Hall, “Competition as Ac-
countability in State Supreme Court Elec-
tions,” in Running for Judge, ed. Streb, 166.
35  Ibid., 183.
36  Rachel Paine Caul½eld, “The Changing Tone
of Judicial Campaigns as a Result of White,” in
Running for Judge, ed. Streb, 34, 55–56.
37  Schaffner and Diascro, “Judicial Elections in
the News,” in Running for Judge, ed. Streb, 136.
38  Hall, “Competition as Accountability in
State Supreme Court Elections,” in Running 
for Judge, ed. Streb, 166.
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not to be swayed by public clamor or
fear of criticism; the duty to uphold 
and apply the law and perform all du-
ties of judicial of½ce impartially; and 
the duty to act at all times in a manner
that promotes public con½dence in the
independence and impartiality of the
judiciary. The attitudinal model of judi-
cial decision-making that drives the
thinking of many political scientists is
only now beginning to be challenged in
a serious way by scholars within the le-
gal community,39 and the implications
for judicial selection are considerable. 
Devotees of nonpartisan elections 
proceed from the assumption that judg-
es are different from other elected of½-
cials in ways that justify a different se-
lection process: whereas governors and
legislators may follow partisan agendas,
judges must follow the law. Those who
favor nonpartisan elections worry that
recent politicization of judicial races has
made politicians of judges, whose elec-
tion increasingly turns on their curry-
ing favor with contributors, interest
groups, and voters by signaling in ad-
vance how they are likely to rule on hot-
button legal issues that may come be-
fore their courts. They argue, however,
that the worst excesses have occurred 
in partisan election states, where judi-
cial candidates are, by de½nition, par-
tisans and where competition for judi-
cial of½ce has been most intense.
Data con½rm that partisan races are,
on average, more heated than nonparti-
san. The spending difference between
partisan and nonpartisan races is stark:
between 1990 and 2004, average spend-
ing in contested nonpartisan elections
was $549,160, as compared to $885,177 
in partisan races. Overall, the percent-
age of supreme court races in which 
the incumbent ran unopposed has been
16.9 percent higher in nonpartisan con-
tests. And between 1980 and 2000 de-
feat rates for incumbents in nonparti-
san races were 7.3 percent as compared
to 23 percent in partisan races. One ex-
planation for this data, however, may 
be that nonpartisan races are less politi-
cized because they furnish voters with
insuf½cient information to promote
competitive races; partisan af½liation
can serve as a rough proxy for the can-
didate’s views on a range of issues that
furnish voters with information they
deem relevant to casting an informed
ballot. That said, nonpartisan races 
have recently become much more com-
petitive affairs. In the 1980s, 40.8 per-
cent of nonpartisan judicial elections
were contested, as compared to 62.5 
percent in the 1990s. (In partisan races,
the percentage of contested races in-
creased from 58.8 percent to 83.1 per-
cent.) And a recent study conducted 
by Matthew Streb found that so-called
nonpartisan races may not be as non-
partisan as commonly assumed:
How involved are party organizations in
nonpartisan judicial campaigns? The an-
swer appears to be that they are quite in-
volved. While parties are not equally ac-
tive in all aspects of nonpartisan judicial
elections (and not necessarily active in
every election cycle), they seem to be es-
pecially important in terms of gotv ef-
forts and increasing name recognition,
candidate recruitment, candidate en-
dorsements, coordinating campaigns 
with candidates, and even raising and 
contributing money.40
39  Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, The Supreme
Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993);
Barry Friedman, “Taking Law Seriously,” Per-
spectives on Politics 4 (2006): 261.
40  Streb, “Partisan Involvement in Partisan
and Nonpartisan Trial Court Elections,” in 
Running for Judge, ed. Streb, 96, 102.
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Of greater concern, perhaps, is the
impact of White on the future of non-
partisan elections. If candidates are 
held to have a constitutional right to
announce their partisan af½liations 
and engage in partisan activities in 
nonpartisan races, as the U.S. Court 
of Appeals ruled in White on remand, 
the practical differences between parti-
san and nonpartisan elections may 
gradually disappear. We have already
seen, in states such as Michigan and
Ohio, where a nominally nonpartisan
general election is preceded by an open-
ly partisan primary election process, 
that the resulting contests can be every
bit as heated as in conventional parti-
san election states. In light of data indi-
cating that when, in response to White,
states relax campaign speech regula-
tions, candidates alter their campaign
speech to capitalize on the relaxed re-
quirements, it is reasonable to predict
that the same will occur if partisan ac-
tivities restrictions are lifted. 
Advocates of merit selection, like pro-
ponents of nonpartisan election, pro-
ceed from the premise that a judge’s du-
ty to follow the law makes judges suf½-
ciently different from other public of½-
cials to warrant a different method of
selection. The two camps part company,
however, over the relative merits of con-
tested elections. Supporters of merit se-
lection operate on three assumptions.
First, contested elections are not a good
way to ensure the selection of capable
and quali½ed judges. Second, contested
elections are inimical to judicial inde-
pendence because they put judges at risk
of losing their jobs for making decisions
that are unpopular with voters who are
incapable of discerning when a judge has
followed the law, committed an honest
error, or made an illegitimate power
grab. Third, politicization of judicial se-
lection in hotly contested races dimin-
ishes public con½dence in the courts. 
A system in which governors appoint
judges from a pool of candidates pre-
quali½ed by an independent commis-
sion, they maintain, is better suited to
ensure that judges are selected on the
basis of merit. To accommodate en-
trenched public preferences for judi-
cial elections, merit selection systems
typically provide for retention elections
that proponents assume, by virtue of
being non-competitive, are less likely 
to become highly politicized, indepen-
dence-threatening affairs that diminish
public con½dence in the courts. 
Available data undercut the assump-
tion that merit selection systems pro-
duce “better” judges. A study conducted
in the 1980s comparing the résumés of
judges chosen in contested elections and
in merit selection systems found no sig-
ni½cant differences: they possess com-
parable legal and judicial experience,
and elected judges were no more likely
than their merit-selected counterparts 
to have partisan political backgrounds.41
(Recent research reveals, too, that there
is no meaningful difference between the
systems in terms of the racial or gender
diversity of the judges selected.42) That
said, it is more dif½cult to quantify in-
tangibles that could support the conclu-
sion that merit-selected judges are “bet-
ter” quali½ed, such as whether, on aver-
41  Henry Glick and Craig Emmert, “Selection
Systems and Judicial Characteristics: The Re-
cruitment of State Supreme Court Judges,” Ju-
dicature 70 (1987): 231–235.
42  Mark Hurwitz and Drew Noble Lanier,
“Explaining Judicial Diversity: The Differ-
ential Ability of Women and Minorities to
Attain Seats on State Supreme and Appellate
Courts,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 3
(2003): 345. For earlier research, see Malia 
Reddick, “Merit Selection: A Review of the
Social Scienti½c Literature,” Dickinson Law
Review 106 (2002): 740–741.
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age, they possess a more judicial temper-
ament, are predisposed to be more im-
partial and independent, or think about
the judicial role in less partisan or other-
wise political ways. A California study,
for example, compared judges initially
appointed to those initially elected and
found that between 1990 and 1999, 29.8
out of every thousand judges initially ap-
pointed had been disciplined, as com-
pared to 43.6 out of every thousand judg-
es who had been initially elected.43
Recent data appear to corroborate 
the assumption that elected judges are
more likely to align their decision-mak-
ing with popular preferences than ap-
pointed judges, and to that extent are
less independent. In their study of state
supreme court review of capital cases,
political scientists Paul Brace and Brent
Boyea found “compelling but circum-
stantial evidence that state supreme
court judges in capital cases may vote
with an eye toward the next election,”
and that “appointed judges and judges
that are retiring all exhibit a higher pro-
pensity to overturn capital convictions
than elective judges who are not retir-
ing,”44 leading Brace and Boyea to a
conclusion worth quoting at length:
In the end, the patterns revealed here in-
dicate that judicial elections expose judg-
es to public sentiment and, on this very
salient issue at least, they respond by ad-
justing their voting in a manner that is
consistent with public opinion. On this
particular issue too, elections serve to
recruit judges who share the public’s val-
ues. Elections thus function in a manner
commonly valued in some democratic
theories, producing elite responsiveness
to mass opinions. When it comes to judi-
cial elections, however, our ½ndings may
give pause to those who value judicial im-
partiality, particularly when it comes to a
matter of life and death.45
Research reveals that in merit selec-
tion systems, politics can play a role in
selecting members of nominating com-
missions, in the deliberations of such
commissions, and in the judges that gov-
ernors ultimately choose from the ap-
proved candidate pool. In response, the
American Bar Association has developed
standards for judicial selection that un-
derscore the importance of preserving
the independent, nonpartisan character
of judicial nominating commissions.46
To conclude from these developments,
however–as some have–that merit se-
lection systems simply move the politics
of judicial selection from the ballot box
to a back room misses an important
point: the primary threat to indepen-
dence arises at the point of reselection,
when judges are put at risk of losing
their jobs for unpopular decisions that
they previously made. And on that score
there is ample support for the conclu-
sion that, with notable exceptions, the
prospect of an incumbent losing her 
seat in a retention election because of
isolated, unpopular decisions is quite
low. Whereas 23 percent of incumbent
supreme court justices lost reelection
bids in partisan elections between 1980
and 2000, and 7.4 percent lost in non-
partisan races, the failure rate in reten-
tion elections was only 1.8 percent. And
between 1964 and 1998 only 52 of 4,58843  Commission on Judicial Performance, Sum-
mary of Disciplinary Statistics (State of Califor-
nia, 1990–1999), 13.
44  Paul Brace and Brent Boyea, “Judicial Se-
lection Methods and Capital Punishment in 
the American States,” in Running for Judge, ed.
Streb, 186, 193–194, 197.
45  Ibid., 199.
46  Report of the Commission on State Judicial
Selection Standards (American Bar Association,
2000).
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candidates in retention elections were
not retained.47
Finally, there is support for the con-
clusion that highly politicized judicial
races diminish public con½dence in the
courts. In his Kentucky-based study,
James Gibson found that “when groups
with direct connections to the decision-
maker give contributions, legitimacy
suffers substantially.”48 He likewise
found that when candidates use attack
ads, legitimacy is adversely affected, al-
beit to a lesser degree. Gibson also ex-
plored the impact of candidate position-
taking on public con½dence and found
none, adding that “even promises to de-
cide cases in speci½c ways have no con-
sequences at all for the legitimacy of the
institution”–although his conclusion
on this point may overgeneralize from
the answers he received to a narrowly
focused question. 
I have argued elsewhere that the op-
timal system for judicial selection is 
one in which judges are appointed by
governors from a pool of commission-
approved candidates, with or without
legislative con½rmation, who, once ap-
pointed, are not subject to reselection
(via reappointment, retention election,
or contested election).49 Such argu-
ments operate from the premise that 
an appointive system alone promotes
judicial independence by ensuring that 
a judge will not be put at risk of losing
her job for making unpopular decisions
that comport with the law as the judge
reads it. Proponents of appointive sys-
tems assume that accountability is bet-
ter promoted by means other than the
ballot box: appellate review, constitu-
tional amendment, adverse publicity,
intrajudicial disciplinary processes, 
and, of course, prospective account-
ability fostered by the appointment
process itself. 
Although few judges actually lose their
retention bids in merit selection states,
the real issue is whether judges nonethe-
less fear defeat at the ballot box and act
on that fear by deciding cases differently
than they otherwise would. Malia Red-
dick, director of research and programs
for the American Judicature Society, re-
ports on a 1991 survey of judges who re-
cently stood for retention, in which
three-½fths of respondents reported that
“retention elections had a pronounced
effect on their behavior on the bench”;
only 14 percent believed that retention
elections gave them independence from
the voters, while “the remaining judges
perceived themselves as responding to
their environment.”50
As far as other accountability-pro-
moting mechanisms are concerned, 
the model codes of judicial conduct
include rules directing judges to be
“faithful to” or to “uphold and apply”
the law.51 These rules have been used
more often than one might suppose to
discipline and sometimes remove ju-
dicial of½cers who chronically or fla-
grantly disregard the rule of law in a
range of contexts.
47  Larry Aspin, “Trends in Judicial Retention
Elections, 1964–1998,” Judicature 83 (1999): 79.
48  James Gibson, “Challenges to the Impar-
tiality of State Supreme Courts,” 17; see also,
Charles Gardner Geyh, “Why Judicial Elec-
tions Stink,” Ohio State Law Journal 64 (2002):
54–55.
49  Ibid.; also Justice in Jeopardy, 70–74.
50  Malia Reddick, “Merit Selection,” 739–740,
which discusses Larry Aspin and William Hall,
“Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior,” Ju-
dicature 77 (1994): 306.
51  aba Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Can-
on 3B(2) (1990); Model Code of Judicial Con-
duct, Rule 2.2 (2007).
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Ultimately, which of the various sys-
tems for judicial selection is “best” de-
pends upon what one is looking for. If
one is looking for a system that maxi-
mizes democratic accountability, then
available data suggest that partisan elec-
tions will ordinarily be optimal. Con-
versely, if one is looking for a system
that maximizes judicial independence,
simple appointment (with or without a
nominating commission) that does not
subject incumbents to a reselection pro-
cess, will usually be the best bet. Non-
partisan election and merit selection/
retention election systems seek to strike
a balance between these relative ex-
tremes, with nonpartisan election sys-
tems placing somewhat greater empha-
sis on democratic accountability and
merit selection/retention elections opt-
ing for somewhat greater independence.
Arguments over the relative merits of
democratic accountability and judicial
independence may be deeply normative,
but turn in large part on an unresolved
empirical question of considerable im-
portance: whether independent judges
follow the law and, if so, how and to
what extent. If the answer is no, as many
political scientists believe, then the pri-
mary justi½cation for judicial indepen-
dence disappears. If law does not con-
strain judges in any meaningful way–
if independent judges are essentially
rogue policy-makers–the norms of a
democratic republic dictate that judges
be brought under greater popular con-
trol, so that the preferences judges act
upon are better aligned with their “con-
stituents.” Conversely, if, as most judges
and lawyers believe, the answer is to
some signi½cant extent yes–if indepen-
dent judges do indeed take law serious-
ly–then judicial independence is back 
in the game. To study this question de-
mands a more serious interdisciplinary
effort than has occurred to date–and
that is no mean feat. Too many political
scientists and lawyers look at each other
and shake their heads, so captured by
the predispositions of their respective
disciplines that they are unable or un-
willing to take the other seriously.52 For
those who have been struggling to pre-
serve and promote an independent judi-
ciary, however, the time has come to
con½rm the empirical foundations upon
which their case rests, or rethink their
premises.
I share New York University law pro-
fessor Barry Friedman’s impressionistic
sense that, outside the political science
sub½eld of attitudinal model scholars,
“most likely there is agreement that atti-
tudes and law both play a role–the ques-
tion is how much, and more particularly,
how much law can constrain. To state it
differently, the question is not so much
whether law plays a role, as what role 
it plays.”53 If so, then judicial indepen-
dence remains a value worth preserving.
But the operative question continues to
be how much independence in relation
to democratic accountability is optimal?
Put another way, when (if ever) does the
cost of enabling judges to act upon their
political preferences or attitudes by insu-
lating them from democratic account-
ability exceed the bene½ts of protecting
them from threats to their tenure that
compromise their capacity to adhere to
the rule of law?
These are big questions that call for
big choices between selection systems.
Constitutional reform culminating in
changes on this order of magnitude is a
rare event. It can be a worthy goal and
52  For an excellent discussion of the divide that
separates academic lawyers and political scien-
tists, see Friedman, “Taking Law Seriously.”
53  Ibid., 264.
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one well worth pursuing (as I have ar-
gued elsewhere), but not at the expense
of ignoring shorter-term remedies that
can make a bad system better in the in-
terim. For those seeking to promote an
independent judiciary in the teeth of re-
cent developments, more modest re-
forms proposed by scholars and organi-
zations include:
•  Increasing the length of judicial terms,
to reduce the frequency with which ju-
dicial tenure is put at risk;54
•  Encouraging candidates to adopt vol-
untary campaign standards, to reduce
negative campaigning and thwart the
impact of White;55
•  Continuing to defend existing ethical
restrictions on judicial campaign con-
duct against constitutional challenge,
at least until the Supreme Court clari-
½es the limits of White;56
•  Developing more comprehensive judi-
cial evaluation programs to provide 
voters in retention elections with more
meaningful information about incum-
bents that reorient voter focus toward
behavioral, rather than decisional, ac-
countability;57
•  Increasing public knowledge about the
role of the judiciary in American gov-
ernment, which has been shown to in-
crease public support for judicial inde-
pendence;58
•  Taking judicial discipline seriously, as a
means to underscore an important way
in which judges who behave badly are
properly held accountable;59
•  Public ½nancing of judicial campaigns
at the appellate level, to reduce the in-
fluence of money on judicial races;60
•  Expanding use of voter guides as a
means to inform voters better about 
the candidates.61
54  Roy A. Schotland, “The Crocodile in the
Bathtub . . . and Other Arguments to Extend
Terms for Trial Judges,” California Courts Re-
view 10 (Fall 2005); “Call to Action: Statement
of the National Summit on Improving Judicial
Selection,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 34
(2001): 1355.
55  Charles Gardner Geyh, “Preserving Public
Con½dence in the Courts in an Age of Individ-
ual Rights and Public Skepticism,” in Bench
Press: The Collision of the Courts, Politics, and the
Media, ed. Keith Bybee (Stanford: Stanford Law
and Politics, 2007). See also, The Constitution
Project, Higher Ground Standards of Conduct
for Judicial Candidates; at http://www.consti-
tutionproject.org/pdf/The_Higher_Ground
_Standards_of_Conduct_for_Judicial_Candi-
dates.pdf.
56  Geyh, “Preserving Public Con½dence in the
Courts in an Age of Individual Rights and Pub-
lic Skepticism,” in Bench Press, ed. Bybee.
57  Seth Andersen, “Judicial Retention Evalua-
tion Programs,” Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
34 (2001): 1375.
58  James Gibson and Gregory Caldeira, “Know-
ing About Courts,” Paper for the 2nd Annual
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies; on ½le.
59  Justice in Jeopardy, 58–59.
60  The Report of the Commission on Public
Financing of Judicial Campaigns (American 
Bar Association, 2002); but see Michael Mal-
bin and Thomas Gais, The Day After Reform:
Sobering Campaign Finance Lessons from the 
American States (Albany, N.Y.: Rockefeller In-
stitute Press, 1998), which questions the viabil-
ity of public ½nancing.
61   “Call to Action,” 1357.
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